NOTES ON PEIRCE AND OST

Purposive (context base II and III) Prob Choice

Prob Effect Prob Outcome Rel. Intention

PIERCE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

In the pursuit of knowledge the criteria of truth is that of CORRESPONDENCE between hypotheses as they are formulated and refined and the outcomes of our actions. The criteria for having achieved true knowledge is the COHERENCE that obtains between correspondences achieved by all those engaged in the pursuit of that knowledge. (Ref. Note on Social Architecture; Pepper).

Even when we arrive at CERTAIN truth we realize that the coherency we have attained pertains to a given framework of knowledge: if that framework is itself overthrown than we accept that we have been in error, or may have been. In this sense we accept the potential RELIABILITY of even the most absolute truths.

In the pursuit of knowledge we go from belief to doubt, doubt to belief. We believe insofar as we are disposed to act in ways that follow from our hypothesis. Of course, our actual behaviours may reflect more that just our predisposition. We doubt when the outcomes of acting on our hypothesis are surprising and unexpected. Such outcomes throw into confusion our dispositions, frustrate our ability to choose a

course of action and force us into new lines of inquiry. Note that disbelief plays no such positive role. If one disbelieves an hypothesis then one simply acts as, unhesitatingly, as if it were false.

Genuine doubt arises in the course of action that is guided by hypotheses about the nature of the real world and is to be contrasted with the spurious self doubt of Descartes.

Genuine doubt presupposes belief and expectation. It is for this reason that science can only grow from a pre-existent body of commonsense, and remains dependent on commonsense for its continued growth. Commonsense itself must be regarded as a foundational knowledge of the world that is not subject to doubt but the world is flat and finite then it is true that sailing westward will eventually bring one to the edge of the world. Commonsense is arrived at by the same process of belief and doubt but not subject to any necessary process of conscious inference. Its roots of belief are genetic in origin – given directly in perception of reality.

INTRODUCTION

QUOTE FROM HEIDER

(the dispensability of psych).

However, with emergence of bureaucracies, multinational firms etc. are creating social fields that are imprecisely grasped by our language. In fact often shrouded in Newspeak and Double-speak. Novelists like Kaffka, Arthur Miller and Orwell have thrown light on some spots; light of an intensity that has simply not been matched by social scientists. What we need is to flood-light the whole area. That way we can hope to gain a more useful knowledge of what we have unwittingly created and how it is changing.

Following Heider we believe that the way to do this is to use the linguistic tools that the novelists, dramatists and poets have used; but to use them more.